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Abstract 
 
 
The article presents an analysis of welfare effects in Slovenia, an analysis of macroeconomic 
effects of the Slovenian pension reform and an analysis of effects of the pension fund deficit on 
sustainability of Slovenian public finances with a dynamic OLG general equilibrium model. 
Stress was layed upon varying two parameters of the current pension system; the age of 
retirement and the indexation rate of pensions. It was established that by tightening these 
parameters the elderly would lose, while the present and future generations would gain. The 
macroeconomic effects were in accordance with expectations; the employment level increased, 
while the effects of tightened parameters on real consumption were negative. Since the PAYG 
burden on incomes decreased, the investment activity and thus the capital stock increased 
somewhat as well. Nevertheless, the long-term impact on the real GDP appeared to be 
ambiguous. Without doubt one has to take into account the demographic slowdown of GDP 
growth. Finally, tightening the parameters of the pension system substantially increased the 
long-term sustainability of the pension system; while lower indexation level of pension 
considerably decreased the deficit of the public pension fund, increase of retirement age was 
even able to delay the incidence of additional deficit. 
 
JEL classification: C68, D58, D61, D91, E62, H55. 
 
Keywords: general equilibrium models, indexation of pensions, macroeconomic effects, OLG-
GE, PAYG, pension system, retirement age, Slovenia, welfare analysis. 
1. Introduction 
 
 
 Economic sustainability of social security systems is under severe pressure 
nowadays due to ageing caused by decreasing fertility rate, increasing life expectancy, 
increasing share of recipients of social benefits, and decreasing share of active population 
(cf. OECD, 2000; European Commission, 2001). These are the reasons for anticipated 
increase of traditional social security benefits and introduction of new types of old-age 
insurance. Among key topics of social security in Slovenia is therefore the development of 
sustainable, efficient and fair system of funding social security in the environment of 
expected further ageing of the population. Mechanisms and actions adopted and 
implemented by the Republic of Slovenia ought to ensure solid foundations for the social 
security, as well as enable and promote social inclusion of the population (cf. IMAD, 
2001). Special emphasis is being put on the pension system due to its weight in the system 
of public finances; therefore it is also the focus of our research. 
 
 Early 1990s represent the beginning of Slovenia’s economic transformation from 
the workers’ self-management to a market economy through the process of restructuring. 
This process, which has led to recession as a result of the loss of former Yugoslavian 
markets, was also the cause of surpluses on the labour market. To maintain social 
sustainability, the costs of transition were shifted to the pension system through mass early 
retirement. If the increasingly perceivable unfavourable demographic developments are 
taken into account, it becomes obvious that the pension system, implemented with the 
1992 Pension and Disability Insurance Act (PDIA), would not be able to sustain the 
pressure. This became distinctly obvious in 1996, when the state pension fund needed 
additional financing from the central budget for the first time. This was enough to start 
intense preparations for the Slovenian pension reform, which was adopted in the form of 
the 1999 PDIA and is being implemented from 1 January 2000. 
 
 In the present analysis we are interested in the effects of varying the parameters of 
the current Slovenian pension system on welfare of different generations in Slovenia and 
on sustainability of Slovenian public finances. Stress is being layed upon two such 
parameters; (1) the age of retirement and (2) the indexation rate of pensions. To achieve 
this, Slovenian economy is being analyzed with an overlapping-generations general 
equilibrium (OLG-GE) model, which is the most developed version of computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) models. Namely, the model SIOLG 2.0 makes possible analysis of 
intra-generational and inter-generational redistribution effects of potential effects of 
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different strategies of public financing in order to achieve sustainable long-term economic 
growth and social development. It also enables monitoring and anticipation of effects of 
unfavourable demographic developments on the volume of social transfers to the 
population. 
 
 The outline of the article is as follows. In Chapter 2 a short description of the OLG 
general equilibrium model of the Slovenian economy is presented, while the developments 
in the Slovenian public pension system from the 1990s onwards are explained in some 
detail in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4 some of the simulation results of the model are presented, 
with special focus on welfare effects, macroeconomic effects of the pension reform and 
effects of the state pension fund deficit on sustainability of public finances. Each of these 
aspects is then being thoroughly analyzed from the viewpoint of altered parameters of the 
Slovenian pension system, i.e. increased age of retirement and decreased indexation rate of 
pensions. In the final chapter we summarize the central findings of the article. 
 
 
2. Description of the OLG-GE Model of the Slovenian Economy 
 
The model SIOLG 2.0 is a dynamic overlapping-generations general equilibrium 
model of the Slovenian economy, based on social accounting matrix (SAM) for the year 
2000, data on demographic structure of the population, expected future demographic 
developments, characteristics of Slovenian households, and decomposition of households 
within generations (cf. Verbič et al., 2006; Verbič, 2007). The model has been developed 
with the very intention of analyzing the sustainability of the Slovenian public finances, 
though it can be used to analyze any part or any sector of the economy. 
 
 The starting points of the OLG-GE model are the life cycle theory of consumption 
by Modigliani and Brumberg (1954) and the permanent income hypothesis by Friedman 
(1957), which are actually special cases of the more general theory of intertemporal 
allocation of consumption (Deaton, 1992). Unlike in the Keynes’s theory of behaviour of 
consumption and savings, based only on current income, in the OLG-GE model 
consumption and savings are derived from intertemporal optimization behaviour and are 
therefore dependent on full lifetime income. In the simplest case of unchanged income 
until retirement (cf. Modigliani, 1986), consumers save during their active lifetime and 
spend their savings after the retirement in order to maintain unchanged consumption. The 
retirement is therefore raison d’etre for saving. 
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 Overlapping-generations general equilibrium models represent the pinnacle of 
dynamic CGE modelling. OLG-GE modelling was established and promoted by Auerbach 
and Kotlikoff (1987) and is based on detailed decomposition of the consumption side of 
the model. Namely, unlike in the Ramsey-type models the consumers live a finite length of 
time, but long enough to live at least one period with the next generations of consumers. 
Determination of consumers by their birth cohort enables analysis of inter-generational 
effects, which makes OLG-GE models especially valuable for analysis of tax policies, 
pension policies and other social policies. 
 
 Dynamic general equilibrium model SIOLG 2.0 comprises not only the standard 
model structure of a national economy, but also the demographic block and the pension 
block, within the framework of which the first and the second pillar of the Slovenian 
pension system are being modelled. Since the model incorporates most of the 
contemporary techniques of the CGE modelling, the arrears in this field in Slovenia 
compared to the rest of the world have practically been eliminated. Namely, the model is 
build within the general algebraic modelling system (GAMS), which has become both 
most widely used programming language and most widespread computer software (Brooke 
et al., 1998) for construction and solving large and complex CGE models. 
 
 Within the GAMS framework, the dynamic general equilibrium model is written in 
Mathiesen’s (1985) formulation of the Arrow-Debreu (1954) equilibrium model, i.e. as a 
mixed complementarity problem (MCP). The key advantage of this formulation is the 
compact presentation of the general equilibrium problem, which is achieved by treating 
variables implicitly and thus significantly reducing the computation time for higher-
dimensional models. Namely, the mathematical program includes equalities as well as 
inequalities, where the complementarity slackness holds between system variables and 
system conditions (cf. Rutherford, 1995a; Böhringer et al., 2003). Functions of the model 
are written in Rutherford’s (1995) calibrated share form; a reasonably straightforward 
algebraic transformation, which nevertheless considerably simplifies the calibration of the 
model (cf. Böhringer et al., 2003; Balistreri and Hillberry, 2003). To solve the model, i.e. to 
achieve convergence, a recent version of the PATH solver (Ferris and Munson, 2000) is 
used, which is renowned for its computational efficiency. 
 
 Consumers live in the model according to their expected length of life, i.e. their life 
expectancy at birth. Assuming that the life expectancy is approximately 80 years and that 
the active lifetime period starts at the age of 20, there are 60 generations in each period of 
the model. There is a new cohort of consumers born in each such period, thus increasing 
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the population, while at the same time a number of consumers pass away and decrease the 
total population. Consumers are observed in five-year intervals within households, which 
maximize the expected lifetime utility subject to their income constraints, where one has to 
put out the need to save for retirement and to support children. Households are 
differentiated in the model according to year of birth, income and size; within each cohort 
distinction is made between couple without children and nuclear family with two children 
on average, and five income profiles representing different income brackets. Consequently, 
there are ten versions of the model altogether, which facilitates analysis of 
intragenerational effects of different economic policies. 
 
 The volume of labour and the labour productivity growth are given exogenously. 
Changes in wages are reflected in changes of the labour supply. Consumption of 
households with children is additionally corrected due to extra cost per child, where the 
children are born in the childbearing age of the woman or, to be precise, the household, i.e. 
in the age bracket of 20-40 years. In the first ten years after retirement the household is 
comprised of two persons and afterwards of one adult. Saving decisions of households 
affect investment decisions of firms in the capital markets and thus future production. The 
effects ascribed herein have recurrent effects on product market through decreasing prices 
and on labour market through higher productivity, leading to higher wages and finally 
higher income of households. Both effects can be analyzed with a dynamic OLG-GE 
model quite straightforwardly. 
 
 The perfect foresight assumption in the forward-looking model specification 
implies the ability of households to perform intertemporal optimization of the present value 
of entire future consumption. In other words, the consumers have full information at their 
disposal, adopt on average the right decisions and are familiar with future modifications of 
key economic indicators, which is the quintessence of rational expectations. They are able 
to anticipate new policies and to prepare themselves to future changes. The assumption of 
equilibrium in all markets and assumption of achieved sustainable economic growth enable 
analysis of different scenarios, which cause deviations from the reference growth path and 
changes in macroeconomic and microeconomic indicators. This is especially important 
when analyzing social security, because it makes possible projecting the effects of 
demographic changes on the social security system. For this we have three variants of 
demographic projections available; the low variant combines lower fertility with lower life 
expectancy and lower net migration, while the high variant combines higher fertility with 
higher life expectancy and higher net migration than in the reference medium variant. 
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 On the other hand, the assumption of perfect foresight is also valid for firms, which 
maximize profits in the environment of perfect competition. Technology is given by the 
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function. The number of production 
sectors in the model is dependent on availability of the input-output table for the base year, 
which means that there are 60 sectors of the standard classification of activities (SCA) 
available for discretionary aggregation. Government spending is dependent on economic 
growth and growth of the population, and is financed with revenues from personal income 
tax, capital income tax, value-added tax and import duties. Sources of revenue of the 
Slovenian system of public finances represent various possibilities of funding different 
economic policies in the simulation phase of the modelling. 
 
 The dynamic general equilibrium model SIOLG 2.0 is closed using the 
Armington’s (1969) assumption of imperfect substitutability, where the commodities are 
separated by its source on domestic and imported products. Demand for imported products 
is derived from cost minimization criterion of firms and utility maximization criterion of 
consumers. As regards the export side of the model, domestically produced products are 
sold at home and abroad, but are nevertheless treated as imperfect substitutes. Slovenia is 
assumed to be a small open economy, implying that the changes in the volumes of imports 
and exports do not affect the terms of trade. International capital flows are endogenous, 
given the intertemporal balance of payments constraint. 
 
 
3. Representation of Developments in the Slovenian Pension System 
 
The Republic of Slovenia inherited the legislation of its pension system, which was 
based on inter-generational contract and is therefore a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system, 
from the former Yugoslavia. After Yugoslavia splintered into newly independent countries 
at the beginning of the 1990s, transformation from the workers’ self-management to a 
modern market economy was initiated in Slovenia, thus requiring the formation of new 
markets and taking its rules into account. However, the consequences of bankruptcy of 
firms, economic recession and restructuring of the business sector, all resulting from 
economic transformation, were being “solved” contemporaneously in order to preserve 
social sustainability by mass early retirement. 
 
 After Slovenia’s independence in 1991, the new pension legislation was adopted 
somewhat behind schedule in 1992, when the restructuring was for the most part already 
finished. Even the rise of retirement age was therefore not able to put the break on early 
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retirement pressure. Because the price of additional years of service was low and therefore 
not consistent with the actuarial principles, purchase of additional years of service was a 
common phenomenon. Consequently, the increase in actual retirement age was modest and 
very close to minimum retirement age. The ratio between the number of insured persons 
and the number of pensioners has been relatively steady over the last decade (Stanovnik, 
2002), although this stability is somewhat misleading for the new pension legislation 
introduced additional categories of insured persons1. 
 
 Legislative modifications adopted in 1992 are partially responsible also for the 
large increase of pension expenditure of the PAYG-financed state pension fund, i.e. the 
Institute for Pension and Disability Insurance (IPDI), in the same year. Namely, with the 
new Pension and Disability Insurance Act the IPDI was compelled to pay contributions for 
health insurance for pensioners, hence contributing at least additional per cent to the ratio 
of pension expenditure to GDP. After 1992 the pension expenditure, measured as 
percentage of GDP, somewhat stabilized at the level of 11 per cent. This could have been a 
sign of financial stabilization of the IPDI; however things took a drastic turn for the worse, 
as we will find out hereinafter. Until 1996 all extensive increases of pension expenditure 
were financed by increasing the pension contribution rate. As a result the (joint employer 
and employee) pension contribution rate ascended from 22.55 per cent of the gross wage in 
1989 to 31 per cent of the gross wage in 1995. Finally, in 1996 the Government of the 
Republic of Slovenia decided to lower the employer pension contribution rate from 15.5 
per cent of the gross wage to 8.85 per cent of the gross wage in order to increase 
competitiveness of the Slovenian economy. 
 
 The year 1996 hence represent a decisive moment, since until then financially 
autonomous state pension fund demonstrated a deficit for the first time, which has after 
that been filled up every year until 2004 with the so-called “generalized” transfers from the 
central budget in order to maintain social stability. Transfers of funds from the central 
government budget to the IPDI indeed existed prior to 1996, but were only intended for 
financing additional obligations of the government, such as pensions of farmers, 
policemen, customs officers and combatants of the World War II. Now the government 
actually committed itself to partially finance pensions, which were primarily established on 
actuarial principles and were before 1996 entirely funded with contributions of the active 
population. Until the economic transformation relatively favourable pension figures 
                                                 
1  Evident examples of introducing additional categories of insured persons are “voluntarily insured 
persons” and “unemployed persons receiving unemployment benefits” for whom the contributions are 
paid by the National Employment Office. 
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become insupportable in just a few years. One should certainly adjoin that the effects of 
demographic changes on the social security system are yet to be observed in the 
subsequent years. 
 
 The decrease of employer pension contributions was thus a “suitable” occasion for 
the extreme measure of transfer funding of the pension system. The insolvency of the 
pension system therefore passed by unnoticed to the general public, but the consequences 
of the pension deficit can be seen in the structure of the Slovenian budget, where there are 
fewer funds available for investments and for research and development. Yet the economic 
situation is commonly not perceived to be so pessimistic. The fiscal position was relatively 
favourable for the whole time and certainly the most promising among the new EU 
member states; the budget deficit was relatively low in the last decade despite the difficult 
situation in the first years of economic transition, hence the public debt increased only 
moderately. 
 
 The problem, which has by that time drawn attention of economists of the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, was being properly addressed with the 
preparation of the White Paper on the subject in 1997, which led to the adoption of new 
PDIA in 1999. The implementation of this law started on 1 January 2000 and is to be 
finished in 2024. The pension system has become more complex than ever before; partially 
due to difficult negotiations in the government coalition, but mainly because of tiresome 
negotiations between management and labour (Stanovnik, 2002). The main characteristic 
of the new pension legislation in comparison with the former legislation is path-
dependency, which appears to be a universal feature of predominantly gradualistic reforms 
of the Slovenian economic system. In addition, the transitional periods are lengthy, so the 
actual values of parameters of the present three-pillar pension system in Slovenia converge 
only gradually to the final values. 
 
 Statutory retirement age under the 1999 PDIA, which guarantees insured persons 
retirement benefits, dependent only on completed years of service (without deductions), is 
63 years for men and 61 years for women. This criterion is to be increased from 58 years 
and 6 months in 2000 by 6 months per annum for men and from 53 years and 4 months in 
2000 by 4 months per annum for women. However, an individual can retire already at the 
age of 58 and receives pension without deductions in case he or she fulfilled the full 
pension qualifying period, which is 40 years of service for men and 38 years of service for 
women. The transitional period terminates at the end of 2008 for men and at the end of 
2022 for women. Minimum pension qualifying period is still 15 years of service. The 
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retirement age can be decreased for every born or adopted child, brought up and supported 
by the insured person at least for five years. 
 
 There is more consideration given in the 1999 PDIA to actuarial fairness for the 
system of incentives and disincentives was adopted in case of retirement before and after 
fulfilment of retirement eligibility criteria, respectively. Namely, for all insured persons 
without full pension qualifying period, retired before completed 63 (men) and 61 years of 
service (women), the pension adequately decreases for every month missing until the 
statutory retirement age. Disincentives are applied to the pension base and amount to 0.1-
0.3 percentage points of accrual rate for every month, negatively depending on actual 
retirement age of such individual; the closer actual retirement age is to statutory retirement 
age, the lower are the deductions. If, on the contrary, the insured pension remains 
employed after completed statutory retirement age and full pension qualifying period, the 
pension adequately increases for every month, completed after the statutory retirement age. 
Incentives likewise amount to 0.1-0.3 percentage points of accrual rate for every month, 
positively depending on actual retirement age of an individual. They are cumulative; yet do 
not rise further after three additional years of service. Both incentives and incentives are to 
be added 1.5 percentage points of accrual rate for every year of service missing or added, 
respectively. 
 
 The calculation of pensions is less favourable for insured persons under the 1999 
PDIA. Old-age pension is calculated from the pension base in per cent, depending on 
number of completed years of service; 35 per cent in case of men and 38 per cent in case of 
women for the first 15 years of service, and 1.5 per cent for each additional year of service 
irrespective of gender. Under the proviso that the insured person is not subjected to 
pension disincentives, the pension in case of full pension qualifying period amounts to 72.5 
per cent of pension base, instead of prior 85 per cent (1992 PDIA). Since the pension base 
under the 1999 PDIA is calculated out of best 18 consecutive years of service instead of 
prior best 10 consecutive years of service (1992 PDIA), the decrease in pensions is even 
higher. Also, the law further diminished possibilities of the self-employed to “tamper” with 
their contribution base. However, the most complex procedures of the 1999 pension 
legislation are revalorization of pension bases and indexation of pensions (cf. Stanovnik, 
2004). Revalorization of the pension base in the Slovenian pension system is a procedure 
of recalculating sources of pensionable income in the best 18 consecutive years of service 
using a vector of revalorization coefficients, in order to obtain the pension base. It is 
actually an instrument in the pension system, used for obtaining horizontal equity between 
existing and new pensioners. Indexation of the pension, on the other hand, is a procedure 
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of adjusting retirement benefits to existent economic developments in the country using a 
complex set of rules, where consumer price index is the floor and wage index is the ceiling 
for the growth rate of pensions. 
 
 It has to be emphasized that in 2005 the Government of the Republic of Slovenia 
introduced several changes to the 1999 PDIA that were aimed at increasing the pensions 
(in real terms). The most important among then was the introduction of full indexation of 
pensions that is being carried out twice a year (in February and in November). 
Additionally, the changes of pension legislation include increases in the level of 
pensioner’s recreation grant and lowering eligibility requirements of the widower’s 
pension. These provisions, especially the introduction of full indexation of pensions, will 
undoubtedly have substantial negative long-term effects on controlling the expenditure of 
the system of public finances. 
 
 The 1999 PDIA introduced a number of elements that improved horizontal equity 
in the system (cf. Stanovnik, 2002). The gender divide regarding eligibility and benefits 
was considerably narrowed. Not only were accrual rates equalized, but the eligibility 
criteria for women are now closer to those for men. Nonetheless, even greater emphasis 
was laid on the principle of vertical equity or “solidarity”. Thus the ratio between two 
comparable pensions2 can not exceed 4:1, which is less than the prior ratio of 4.8:1 (1992 
PDIA). Instead of explicit minimum and maximum pension, the Slovenian pension system 
includes minimum and maximum pension base; the former is set nominally, yet amounted 
to approximately 62.5 per cent of average net wage in 2000, while the latter is four times 
the minimum pension base. A further redistributive element lies in the fact that social 
security contributions are not capped. 
 
 And, last but not least, one should make known a very important novelty of the 
1999 pension legislation, besides the system of incentives and disincentives. Namely, 
pensions of the existing pensioners are adjusted to entry pensions of new pensioners 
according to Article 151 of the 1999 PDIA; the adjustment amounts approximately to –0.6 
percentage points of the pension per annum. This means that pensions of existing 
pensioners are being decreased in real terms, taking account of the lower pensions of new 
entrants. There was an initiative given to the Institutional Court of the Republic of 
Slovenia for constitutional review of this article, but the Court ruled in December 2003 that 
the article is congruent with the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia. Such outcome is 
                                                 
2  Comparable pensions exist when two pensioners enter the pension system under the same conditions and 
both have full pension qualifying period. 
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particularly important, since this modification of the pension legislation represent a large 
share of overall effects of the pension reform and has also a significant positive effect on 
managing expenditure of the pension system. 
 
 
4. Results of the OLG-GE Simulations 
 
The groundwork for our analysis is execution of dynamic calibration of the OLG-
GE model and consequently preparation of the pertinent reference solution. In the 
framework of performing dynamic calibration of the model SIOLG 2.0, we follow the 
strategy of using the model to generate the entire dynamic path of endogenous variables in 
order to accurately reproduce the values of every endogenous variable in the base year 
(2000). The dynamic calibration scenario described herein simultaneously represents the 
benchmark scenario (BENCH), referring to steady-state growth of all relevant variables in 
the model. The reference scenario (REFER) is then obtained by solving the model with 
implemented both demographic and pension block, where additional deficit3 of the state 
pension fund at changed demographic structure is being financed from the central 
government budget with revenues from value-added tax. Alternatively, the additional 
deficit could have been financed with revenues from labour income tax. The initial (base-
year) IPDI deficit is of course being funded by pension contributions. The reference 
scenario represents the basis for comparison of consequences of a range of economic 
policies in the system of public finances. 
 
 Analysis of the Slovenian economy, where we take into account upcoming 
developments of the Slovenian pension system, is then performed by forming two 
counterfactual scenarios and comparing their outcomes to the results of the reference 
scenario. Whereas the latter refers to the present structure of financing the pension system, 
where only the additional deficit is being financed with revenues from value-added tax, the 
counterfactual scenarios are different. Namely, in the first counterfactual scenario (VAT) 
we assume that the entire state pension fund is financed with revenues from value-added 
tax, while in the second counterfactual scenario (LABS) the IPDI is by assumption funded 
exclusively with revenues from labour income tax. These scenarios are used in order to 
represent the effects of two extreme approaches to funding the pension system and to 
demonstrate their strengths and weaknesses. We commence by analyzing welfare effects in 
Slovenia, followed by an analysis of macroeconomic effects of the Slovenian pension 
                                                 
3  Additional deficit is the excess of the state pension fund deficit in a particular year over its value in the 
base year, when it amounted to 3.9 per cent of the GDP. 
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reform, whilst the chapter is being concluded by analyzing effects of the IPDI deficit on 
sustainability of Slovenian public finances. 
 
 Unless explicitly stated otherwise, steady-state growth rate of 2.5 per cent and 
medium variant of demographic projections are used for OLG-GE simulations. The GDP 
growth is endogenously determined, while the productivity growth is exogenous and equal 
to the chosen steady-state growth. Wage growth follows the productivity growth, but is 
also dependent on changes in labour supply. The pension block of the model SIOLG 2.0 
follows the 1999 PDIA and its subsequent changes with the following key elements: (1) 
pension as proportion of the pension base is gradually decreasing for new and existing 
pensioners to 72.5 per cent; (2) number of consecutive years of service for calculation of 
the pension base is gradually increasing from 10 to 18; (3) eligibility criteria for retirement 
are being raised, to be reflected in estimated increase in average retirement age of either 2 
years for men and 4 years for women or 7 years for men and 9 years for women; (4) 
average pension growth reaches either 100 or 80 per cent of average wage growth; and (5) 
calculation of the revalorization coefficients is based on lagging of pension growth behind 
wage growth, which enables equalizing the financial situation among existing and new 
pensioners. Supplementary pension saving in the second pension pillar remains at the 
reference level, while the growth of residual non-pension expenditure of the IPDI follows 
population growth and exogenous productivity growth. 
 
 
4.1. An Analysis of Welfare Effects in Slovenia 
 
For the purpose of welfare analysis we use the Hicks’s equivalent variations (HEV) 
as a measure of change in the welfare of generations. Equivalent variations can be defined 
as the equivalent percentage change in full lifetime resources needed in the reference 
scenario to produce the same level of welfare under the counterfactual scenarios. A 
positive value means that a generation will gain from switching from the reference 
scenario to the counterfactual scenario. The inter-generational redistribution effects for the 
current pension system parameter values in Slovenia, i.e. retirement age of 60 years and 
full (100 per cent) indexation of pensions, are shown in Figure 1. 
 
 11
Figure 1. Welfare effects in Slovenia in case of applying different sources of financing the pension 
system (retirement age of 60 years and full indexation) 
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Source: Author’s simulations using SIOLG 2.0. 
 
 
 A first glance at the Figure 1 shows that in case of funding the pension system with 
revenues from value-added tax, the future generations would gain. It is obvious that in this 
scenario the elderly would lose, as they have to pay more value-added tax in comparison 
with the reference scenario; they would be forced to bear a larger burden of the present 
value of public expenditure. In case of funding the pension system with revenues from 
labour income tax, all future generations would lose, as they alone would need to bear the 
burden of public expenditure. 
 
 Funding of the pension system with revenues from value-added tax appears to be 
somewhat better alternative than funding of the pension system with pension contributions, 
which can be explained as follows. Replacement of social security contributions with 
revenues from value-added tax improves financial situation of young generations for the 
consumption of the elderly is being taxed additionally. Since young generations have lower 
marginal propensity to consume compared to the elderly, after the tax reform their 
consumption decreases, whilst their supply of labour has to increase. Total consumption 
therefore decreases, whereas the total labour supply increases; savings increase and higher 
capital stock leads to higher GDP. 
 
 As value-added tax rate is raised over time, making consumption in the future more 
expensive, the value-added tax acts like a capital income tax. In case of funding the 
pension system with revenues from value-added tax, there is a substantial increase in 
labour supply. This is to a lesser extent also true in case of funding the pension system with 
revenues from labour income tax. People will not only work more, they will also work 
 12
longer. The retired generations suddenly have to pay an increased tax on their 
consumption. As they live on their savings, the only way to keep their consumption at 
unchanged level is by providing additional labour to the labour market, i.e. by retiring 
later. Correspondingly, a raising labour income tax rate will change the relative 
intertemporal prices of leisure. The future price of leisure will fall relatively to the price of 
current leisure, inducing a substitution of future for current labour supply. 
 
 Figure 2 presents the changes in inter-generational redistribution effects in Slovenia 
in case of decreasing the indexation rate from 100 to 80 per cent and increasing the 
retirement age from 60 to 65 years. It can be observed that by tightening the parameters of 
the present pension system the elderly would lose, while the present and future generations 
would gain. In case of introducing partial (80 per cent) indexation of pensions, the 
pensions (on average the only source of income) of the elderly would decrease, leading to 
direct negative effects on their welfare, while the (future) pensions of the present and 
future active generations would indeed decrease as well, though in a PAYG system the 
burden imposed on them by the intergenerational contract to finance the pensions of 
currently retired people would evidently decrease by even more. 
 
Figure 2. Welfare changes in Slovenia in case of decreasing the indexation rate from 100 to 80 
per cent and increasing the retirement age from 60 to 65 years 
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Source: Author’s simulations using SIOLG 2.0. 
 
 
 In case of increasing the retirement age from 60 to 65 years we obtain similar 
results. Generations that would lose the most are the ones just to be retired, while the 
present and future generations would gain, since by supplying more labour throughout 
their lifecycle they would earn more and thus they would also be able to consume more. In 
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a PAYG pension system their pensions, calculated by the pension formula and indexed to 
wages through the indexation process, would be higher and the loss of welfare caused by 
the decreased leisure time would evidently not be high enough to compensate the positive 
effects of increased consumption. 
 
 Another important aspect of the tax reform is its overall efficiency effect. In order 
to obtain this effect, we have changed the model in such a way that there are no inter-
generational effects; all generations lose or gain the same amount. This is accomplished by 
introducing a lump-sum redistribution authority (LSRA), which redistributes gains and 
losses evenly among the generations using lump-sum transfers. These transfers have no 
distortional effects; hence what remains is the pure efficiency effect of the tax reform. As 
can be seen in Table 1, there is a positive overall efficiency effect in case of funding the 
pension system with revenues from value-added tax, i.e. the welfare level of all generations 
increases by 0.29-0.35 per cent. In contrast, the overall efficiency effect in case of funding 
the pension system with revenues from labour income tax is negative; the welfare level of 
all generations decreases by 0.12-0.74 per cent. 
 
Table 1. Overall effect on efficiency (LSRA) given different methods of financing the pension 
deficit, different retirement ages, and different levels of indexation 
 
Scenario determination  Efficiency effect (LSRA) 
Retirement age  Indexation level  VAT vs. REFER LABS vs. REFER 
100 per cent indexation  0.29% –0.74% 60 years 
80 per cent indexation  0.35% –0.51% 
100 per cent indexation  0.29% –0.22% 65 years 80 per cent indexation  0.34% –0.12% 
 
Source: Author’s simulations using SIOLG 2.0. 
 
 
 Although potential financing of the pension system with revenues from value-added 
tax has a clearly positive effect on the economy in the long run, one has to bear in mind 
that a switch to a situation where a part of the social security system is financed by 
revenues from value added taxes is probably politically infeasible, as the generations that 
would decide on the tax reform are the ones that would lose. This is unfortunate as the 
young generations are the ones that will have to cope with relatively lower pensions and at 
the same time with higher taxes to finance the social security system. 
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4.2. An Analysis of Macroeconomic Effects of the Slovenian Pension Reform 
 
Based on developed scenarios, it can be established that the choice of source of 
financing pensions does not have a significant effect on GDP growth and thus on GDP 
level. Namely, neither the annual growth rate in case of financing the pension system with 
revenues from value-added tax nor the annual growth rate in case of financing the pension 
system with revenues from labour income tax differ much from the annual growth rate of 
the GDP in the reference scenario, as can be seen from Figure 3 for the current pension 
system parameter values in Slovenia, i.e. retirement age of 60 years and full indexation of 
pensions. One should bear in mind that in the benchmark scenario, i.e. in the case with 
highest GDP growth (see Figure 3), unfavourable demographic developments are not 
implemented, and thus the differences between the benchmark scenario and other three 
scenarios clearly demonstrate the demographic slowdown of GDP growth. 
 
Figure 3. Expected gross domestic product in Slovenia in case of applying different sources of 
financing the pension system (retirement age of 60 years and full indexation) 
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Note: The base year (2000) is not fixed in the model, because this would lead to too many additional 
restrictions on the model, i.e. it would increase its complexity significantly, and indirectly make the 
model less solvable. As a consequence of this fact the changes to economic variables occur already in 
the year 2000. The problem that arised is being ‘solved’ by fixing the (pre)model year of 1995. 
 
Source: Author’s simulations using SIOLG 2.0. 
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 The effects of funding the pension system with revenues from value-added tax and 
with revenues from labour income tax on consumption, investment (savings4) and capital 
stock can be ascertained from Figures 4 – 6, respectively. Increase in the value-added tax 
rate makes consumption more expensive and therefore encourages households to reduce 
their present consumption (see Figure 4), and increase savings and therefore investment 
(Figure 5). This increases the capital stock (see Figure 6) and raises the level of possible 
future consumption. Increase in the labour income tax rate, on the other hand, increases the 
price of present compared to future leisure, inducing substitution of future for current 
labour supply. The latter therefore decreases. In order to maintain the present level of 
consumption (see the long-term trend on Figure 4), households decrease current savings, 
thus decreasing investment (Figure 5). This has an effect of decreasing the capital stock 
(see Figure 6), though it can potentially also represent an increase in the level of future 
consumption. 
 
Figure 4. Expected real consumption in Slovenia in case of applying different sources of 
financing the pension system (retirement age of 60 years and full indexation) 
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Source: Author’s simulations using SIOLG 2.0. 
 
 
                                                 
4 Since general equilibrium theory is acknowledged as a version of the neoclassical theory, in an OLG-GE 
model effects on investment are also effects on savings. 
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Figure 5. Expected real investments in Slovenia in case of applying different sources of financing 
the pension system (retirement age of 60 years and full indexation) 
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Source: Author’s simulations using SIOLG 2.0. 
 
 
Figure 6. Expected capital stock in Slovenia in case of applying different sources of financing the 
pension system (retirement age of 60 years and full indexation) 
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Source: Author’s simulations using SIOLG 2.0. 
 
 
 The real interest rate changes can easily be explained by the effects of different 
scenarios on the capital stock (see Figure 7). In case of funding the pension system with 
revenues from value-added tax, the capital stock grows by more than in the reference case 
(Figure 7), which alone leads to a substantial fall in the real interest rate. This should be 
kept in mind as the second pillar, which is a fully-funded system in Slovenia, is expected to 
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become of more importance in the following decades. In case of funding the pension 
system with revenues from labour income tax, on the other hand, the capital stock grows 
by less than in the reference case (see Figure 7), which leads to a somewhat higher real 
interest rate in the long run. 
 
Figure 7. Expected real interest rate in Slovenia in case of applying different sources of financing 
the pension system (retirement age of 60 years and full indexation) 
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Source: Author’s simulations using SIOLG 2.0. 
 
Figure 8. Expected consumer price index in Slovenia in case of applying different sources of 
financing the pension system (retirement age of 60 years and full indexation) 
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Source: Author’s simulations using SIOLG 2.0. 
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 In case of funding the pension system with revenues from value-added tax, an 
important initial decline of real wages would arise (see Figure 9) due to necessary increase 
in the value-added tax rate and resulting raise in consumer prices (Figure 8). To keep 
unchanged level of consumption, economic agents need to increase their labour supply, 
hence the employment also increases (see Figure 10). Due to anticipated unfavourable 
demographic developments and consequential decrease in the number of active population, 
the labour supply and production factor prices would then adjust accordingly. Thus the real 
wages in case of funding the pension system with revenues from value-added tax are 
anticipated to gradually increase (after the initial decrease), as a consequence of gradual 
lessening of growth of consumer prices and accompanying increasing of labour costs. 
Changes in production factor prices would cause rising employment to settle down at 
somewhat higher level in comparison with the reference case. 
 
Figure 9. Expected real wages in Slovenia in case of applying different sources of financing the 
pension system (retirement age of 60 years and full indexation) 
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Source: Author’s simulations using SIOLG 2.0. 
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Figure 10. Expected employment in Slovenia in case of applying different sources of financing the 
pension system (retirement age of 60 years and full indexation) 
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Source: Author’s simulations using SIOLG 2.0. 
 
 
 In case of funding the pension system with revenues from labour income tax, 
increases of labour income tax rate would, as already said, alter the intertemporal price of 
leisure. The future price of leisure would decrease in comparison with the present price of 
leisure, resulting in substitution of future labour supply for present labour supply. 
Employment would consequently decrease (see Figure 10). The additional increase of 
labour income tax rate, needed to cover the IPDI deficit, would lead to additional reduction 
in the level of employment, while at the same time consumer prices would decrease in 
comparison with consumer prices in the reference case (Figure 8), resulting in rising real 
wages in comparison with real wages in the reference case (see Figure 9). The latter is 
certainly also a consequence of increasing labour costs due to declining number of active 
population. 
 
 Now consider the effect of the parameter values of the Slovenian pension system on 
macroeconomic trends within the Slovenian economy. Specifically, let us consider the 
retirement age and the level of indexation of pensions with respect to wages. Adjusting the 
parameter values assumed for the current pension system in this article leads to complex 
reciprocal effects within the economy between sources and sinks of economic activity by 
market participants. As Figure 11 indicates, raising the retirement age to 65 years increases 
the employment level as anticipated, as the activity rate in the 60-65 bracket increases 
significantly. Under the neoclassical assumption of perfect competition and assuming the 
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absence of a transition period for the measure, introducing a partial (80%) pension 
indexation also has a positive initial impact on employment (Figure 11), before the 
reciprocal actions of remain factors come into play and compensate for this effect. This 
part of the effect on real consumption, which is linked to raising the retirement age, and 
illustrated in Figure 12, is negative as anticipated. The effect on real consumption, related 
to the introduction of partial indexation, is analogous, although the reduction in 
consumption is less pronounced in this case (Figure 12). 
 
 
Figure 11. Expected change in employment in Slovenia due to raising retirement age to 65 years 
and reducing the indexation level to 80 per cent 
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Source: Author’s simulations using SIOLG 2.0. 
 
 
Figure 12. Expected real consumption in Slovenia due to raising retirement age to 65 years and 
reducing the indexation level to 80 per cent 
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Source: Author’s simulations using SIOLG 2.0. 
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 Within a PAYG pension system, the introduction of partial pension indexation 
leads to a reduction in the burden on current active generations to finance the pensions of 
retired generations, as it reduced the pressure from pension insurance contributions on 
employee labour costs. This can lead to increased investment, due to the release of 
resources, as illustrated by Figure 13. On the other hand, the increase in employment that 
primarily comes from raising the retirement age where no significant changes occur to the 
prices of production factors, leads to the balancing of capital-labour ratio, which then leads 
to investment activity. The latter effect is evidently more intense (see Figure 13). The 
consequences of higher investment activity are evident in the capital stock, which increases 
(Figure 14); in the long-term this applies particularly to raising the retirement age. 
 
 
Figure 13. Expected change in real investment in Slovenia due to raising retirement age to 65 
years and reducing the indexation level to 80 per cent 
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Source: Author’s simulations using SIOLG 2.0. 
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Figure 14. Expected change in capital stock in Slovenia due to raising retirement age to 65 years 
and reducing the indexation level to 80 per cent 
-1.50
-1.00
-0.50
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
2005 2015 2025 2035 2045 2055 2065 2075 2085 2095 2105 2115
Year
D
ev
ia
tio
n 
in
 p
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
po
in
ts
Decrease of indexation rate
Increase of retirement age
 
Source: Author’s simulations using SIOLG 2.0. 
 
 Based on Figure 15, it could be concluded that the effect of adjusting the parameter 
values of the current pension system on real growth of GDP is somewhat ambiguous (see 
Figure 15). In the case of raising the retirement age as well as introducing partial pension 
indexation, the initial increase in investment activity leads to somewhat higher real growth 
in GDP, but this effect quickly disappears and the real GDP growth change starts to 
fluctuate around zero. Nonetheless, the effect of adjusting the parameter values of the 
pension system is weak in the long-term. The demographic slowdown of the real GDP 
growth is undoubtedly one of the contemporary economic phenomena that have to be taken 
into account herein. 
 
Figure 15. Expected change in real GDP growth in Slovenia due to raising retirement age to 65 
years and reducing the indexation level to 80 per cent 
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Source: Author’s simulations using SIOLG 2.0. 
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4.3. An Analysis of Effects of the Pension Fund Deficit on Sustainability of Slovenian 
Public Finances 
 
The model simulations indicate that in case of the current situation in the pension 
system, i.e. given retirement age of 60 years and full indexation of pensions with respect to 
wages, the additional IPDI deficit would grow to between 10% and 12% of GDP by 2040, 
given the scenario applied (see Figure 16). The significantly higher deficit seen in the 
scenario where the public pension system is financed with revenues from labour income 
tax is a consequence of growth of real wages and of a lower rate of GDP growth, compared 
to the reference scenario. To understand the dimensions of the forecast growth in pension 
expenditure, it is sufficient to mention the fact that over the period 1947 to 1951, when the 
pension system started functioning, the total proportion of the IPDI’s funds in GDP was 
just 2.5% (Stanovnik and Kukar, 1995). Meanwhile, at the beginning of the 1990s, due to a 
drastic fall in the number of employees and the subsequent steep rise in pensioners, 
pension expenditure had already passed the 10% of GDP milestone, with the figure settling 
at around 13% of GDP following the implementation of the 1999 pension reform. 
 
Figure 16. Additional deficit of the Slovenian state pension fund in case of applying different 
sources of financing the pension system (retirement age of 60 years and full 
indexation) 
-16.0%
-14.0%
-12.0%
-10.0%
-8.0%
-6.0%
-4.0%
-2.0%
0.0%
2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Year
A
dd
iti
on
al
 d
ef
ic
it 
of
 th
e 
pe
ns
io
n 
fu
nd
(in
 p
er
 c
en
t o
f G
D
P)
REFER
VAT
LABS
 
Source: Author’s simulations using SIOLG 2.0. 
 
 It should be pointed out that the selection of the method for indexing pensions has 
an important impact on the pension fund deficit (see Figure 17); namely, the transition 
from full to partial (80%) indexation of pensions to wage in the counterfactual scenarios 
represents a reduction in the pension fund deficit in 2040 of 2.18 GDP percentage points. 
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Increasing the retirement age has an even more beneficial effect on the pension fund 
balance (Figure 17); the transition from a retirement age of 60 years to 65 years in the 
counterfactual scenarios represents a reduction in the pension fund deficit in 2040 of 3.22 
GDP percentage points. Furthermore, the higher retirement age also defers the occurrence 
of an additional pension fund deficit by approximately ten years. Finally, the joint effect of 
increased retirement age and introduction of partial indexation of pensions would in the 
counterfactual scenarios represent a decrease of the IPDI deficit in 2040 by as much as 
4.12 GDP percentage points. 
 
Figure 17. Change in the deficit of the Slovenian state pension fund in case of increasing the 
retirement age to 65 years and decreasing the level of indexation to 80 per cent 
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Source: Author’s simulations using SIOLG 2.0. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The article presents an analysis of welfare effects in Slovenia, an analysis of 
macroeconomic effects of the Slovenian pension reform and an analysis of effects of the 
pension fund deficit on sustainability of Slovenian public finances. Stress was layed upon 
varying two parameters of the current pension system; the age of retirement and the 
indexation rate of pensions. Thus a dynamic OLG general equilibrium model was 
constructed, which enables analysis of intra-generational and inter-generational 
redistribution effects of different strategies of public financing in order to achieve 
sustainable economic growth. Different scenarios were then prepared and analyzed with 
the model SIOLG 2.0 in order to fulfil our goal. 
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 It has been established that by tightening the parameters of the present pension 
system the elderly would lose, while the present and future generations would gain. In case 
of introducing partial indexation of pensions, the pensions of the elderly would decrease, 
leading to direct negative effects on their welfare, while the pensions of the present and 
future active generations would indeed decrease as well, though in a PAYG system the 
burden imposed on them by the intergenerational contract to finance the pensions of 
currently retired people would evidently decrease by even more. In case of increasing the 
retirement age the generations that would lose the most are the ones just to be retired, 
while the present and future generations would gain, since by supplying more labour 
throughout their lifecycle they would earn more and thus they would also be able to 
consume more. In a PAYG pension system their pensions would be higher and the loss of 
welfare caused by the decreased leisure time would evidently not be high enough to 
compensate the positive effects of increased consumption. 
 
 From the macroeconomic perspective, raising the retirement age as anticipated 
increases the employment level, as the activity rate in the currently active age bracket 
increases significantly. Under the neoclassical assumption of perfect competition and 
assuming the absence of a transition period for the measure, introducing a partial (80%) 
indexation of pensions with respect to wages also has a positive initial impact on 
employment, before the reciprocal actions of remaining factors come into play and 
compensate for this effect. The part of the effect on real consumption, which is linked to an 
increase in the retirement age, is negative as anticipated. The effect on real consumption 
related to the introduction of partial indexation is analogous, although the reduction in 
consumption is less pronounced in this case. 
 
 Within a PAYG pension system, the introduction of partial pension indexation 
leads to a reduction in the burden for financing the pensions of retired generations on 
current active generations, as it reduced the pressure from pension insurance contributions 
on employee labour costs. This can lead to increased investment, due to the release of 
resources. On the other hand, the increase in employment that primarily comes from 
raising the retirement age where no significant changes occur to the prices of production 
factors, leads to the balancing of capital-labour ratio, which then leads to investment 
activity. The latter effect is evidently more intense. The consequences of higher investment 
activity are evident in the level of capital stock, which increases; in the long-term this 
applies particularly to the case of raising the retirement age. 
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 The effect of adjusting the parameter values of the current pension system on real 
growth of GDP was nevertheless rather ambiguous. In the case of raising the retirement 
age as well as introducing partial pension indexation, the initial increase in investment 
activity leads to somewhat higher real growth of GDP, but this effect quickly disappears 
and the real GDP growth change starts to fluctuate around zero. The effects of adjusting 
the parameter values of the pension system are therefore weak in the long-term. This 
undoubtedly has to take into account the demographic slowdown of real GDP growth. 
 
 And finally, the selection of the method of pension indexation also has an impact 
on the pension deficit. The transition from a full to an 80% indexation of pensions with 
respect to wages in the counterfactual scenarios represents a reduction in the pension fund 
deficit in 2040 by 2.18 GDP percentage points. Increasing the retirement age has an even 
more beneficial effect on the pension fund deficit; the transition from a retirement age of 
60 years to 65 years in the counterfactual scenarios represents a reduction in the pension 
fund deficit in 2040 by as much as 3.22 GDP percentage points. Furthermore, the higher 
retirement age also defers the occurrence of an additional pension fund deficit by 
approximately ten years. The overall effect of a higher retirement age and the introduction 
of the partial pension indexation is likely to lead in the counterfactual scenarios to a 
reduction in the pension fund deficit in 2040 by 4.12 GDP percentage points. 
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